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I. MANDATE OF THE STUDY GROUP 
 
According to McNair, interpretation is a topic that is approached with the greatest of 
trepidation,
1
 which it is perhaps why it has never formed in and of itself a topic of study of 
the Institut de Droit International, the International Law Association (ILA), or the 
International Law Commission (ILC). It is always raised in connection with another topic 
which forms the basis of analysis. Yet, despite the fact that one would be hard pressed to 
find an international case in which no issue of interpretation has been raised, and that 
myriad articles and books are written each year on the topic, interpretation still raises 
complex and unresolved issues. 
 
The present Study Group aims to fill this lacuna. It aims to put the rules of 
interpretation in the spotlight and research relatively unexplored areas regarding their 
scope and application. The Study Group will aim for completion of its work by 2018.   
 
 Six areas of research were identified as the most apposite for producing meaningful 
results. These issues were outlined in a document prepared by the Rapporteurs,
2
 and were 
the following (hereinafter referred to as topics 1 to 6):  
 
1. Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation 
2. Content of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) & 
Customary Rules of Interpretation: Elements in Need of Clarification & 
Points of Divergence 
3. The Rules of Interpretation Across Regimes 
4. Interpretation of Customary International Law 
5. Interpretation of Unilateral Acts and Declarations 
6. Interpretation of Acts/Secondary Instruments of International Organisations. 
 
These points will be elaborated below in the relevant sections of this Report.  
 
II. THE ROAD SO FAR 
  
The ILA Study Group on Content and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation was 
established in May 2015, upon approval by the Executive Council of the ILA. The Study 
Group held its inaugural meeting on 13-14 May 2016 in Athens, with the generous 
financial contribution of the Athens Public International Law Center (AthensPIL) and 
PluriCourts - Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the Global 
Order. It took place at the premises of the European Public Law Organization (EPLO). The 
following members participated in the meeting: Professor Photini Pazartzis, Professor Geir 
Ulfstein, Dr. Panos Merkouris, Dr. Daniel Peat, Dr. Eirik Bjorge, Professor Andreas 
                                                     
1
 Arnold D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), at 364. 
2
 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘ILA Study Group Road Map’. 
- 4 - 
Føllesdal, Dr. Andreas Kulick, Professor Albrecht Weber.
3
 The other members of the 
Study Group offered in advance thoughts and comments on the topics in discussion. 
 
 During the Study Group’s inaugural meeting, the ILA Study Group Road Map was 
presented and discussed. The members present showed particular interest in certain topics, 
but it was decided that finalisation of the work agenda of the Study Group should occur 
after the input of all members of the Study Group and other ILA members at Johannesburg. 
This Preliminary Report summarises the proposals made in the Road Map and the 
comments of members made at the first meeting of the Study Group in Athens or in 
absentia. 
 
III. RESEARCH POINTS IDENTIFIED IN THE ROAD MAP 
 
1. Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation 
i. ‘Rules’ 
One of the first topics of discussion during the first meeting of the Study Group was 
the use of the term ‘rules’ in the title of the Study Group. The principal issue discussed was 
whether the Study Group should take a position on whether the ‘rules’ of interpretation are 
in fact rules, or rather whether they are ‘principles’, ‘maxims’, ‘canons’ or the such. 
Despite different views as to the nature of the ‘rules’ of interpretation, there was consensus 
that such a theoretical enquiry was not fruitful at this stage in the project and that, for 
pragmatic reasons, it would be best to remain ‘agnostic’ on the matter and use the term 
‘rules’ until the project had progressed.  
 
ii. ‘Evolution’ 
Despite the existence of extensive literature surrounding the role and content of the 
rules of interpretation of treaties, very little attention has been given to the potentially 
evolving nature of these rules. International courts and tribunals pay lip service to the 
customary nature of the rules of interpretation,
4
 yet they approach the rules as if they are 
frozen in time with a clearly defined and unchangeable content. This is somewhat 
surprising considering that, with respect to treaties, considerations of time and change 
frequently factor into judicial and academic writing, such as the tug-of-war between the 
principle of contemporaneity and dynamic/evolutive interpretation.  A similar process has 
not been examined with respect to the rules of interpretation themselves. This lacuna 
becomes even more critical since international courts and tribunals often have to interpret 
                                                     
3
 In this context, the authors of this preliminary report would like to thank the research fellows and junior 
researchers of the Athens PIL who took upon themselves the laborious task of keeping the minutes of this 
meeting: Dr. Nikolaos Voulgaris, Mr. Orfeas Chasapis Tassinis, and Ms. Aikaterini Pitsoli.  
4
 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, [1999] ICJ Rep. 1045, 
para. 18; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, [1994] ICJ 
Rep. 6, para. 41; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 
Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 12 December 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 803, para. 23 
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 In doing so they apply the customary rules of 
interpretation as enshrined in Article 31-33 VCLT. This, however, may raise concerns as to 
the conformity of this practice with the principle of non-retroactivity,
6




A number of questions could fall within this area of research, such as:  
 
 can the rules of interpretation evolve through time, and have they done so? 
 what are the critical changes that have occurred through time? 
 when interpreting a pre-VCLT treaty (or a treaty where a non-VCLT party is 
involved), which rules of interpretation are applicable ˗ the rules at the time 
of the conclusion of the treaty or the rules at the time of the interpretation of 
the treaty? 
 
The members of the Study Group agreed that this was an interesting topic. Members 
debated the use of the term ‘evolution’. Some members considered that the term 
‘evolution’ had inherent connotations related to the nature of the ‘rules’.8 Others noted that 
the ‘evolution’ of the rules of interpretation could also be seen as a matter of divergent 
‘practice’ in the interpretation and application of the rules. Finally, others felt that the term 
‘evolution’ was an apt description as it ‘will produce different species of interpretation 
filling different ecological niches’. Bearing in mind the position of the Study Group to 
remain ‘agnostic’ as to the nature of the ‘rules of interpretation’, it was felt that the term 
‘evolution’ could be retained as a working term for the time being. Discussion on its 
appropriateness could be revisited once the work of the Study Group had progressed and 
produced concrete results that would allow it to take a position on the matter.  
 
The ideal structure for this topic of research, as proposed by the Co-Chairs, was to 
split it into two eras: pre-VCLT and post-VCLT. The former could function as a historical 
introduction to the body of the research of the Study Group. The post-VCLT research 
could be integrated into other topics of the Road Map, notably topics 2 and 3. All members 
were in agreement that this was the optimal course of action. 
 
 
2. Content of the VCLT & Customary Rules of Interpretation: Elements in 
Need of Clarification & Points of Divergence 
 
                                                     
5
 See for instance: Kasikili/Sedudu Island (n4); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment of 17 December 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 625. 
6
 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (n4) Declaration of Judge Oda, para. 4. 
7
 H. Fox, ‘Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention and the Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case,” in: M. 
Fitzmaurice et al (eds.), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years 
on (Martinus Nijhoff 2010), 59; P. Tavernier, ‘Observations sur le droit intertemporal dans l'affaire de l'île de 
Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie)’ (2000) 104 RGDIP 429; P. Merkouris, ‘(Inter)Temporal 
Considerations in the Interpretative Process of the VCLT: Do Treaties Endure, Perdure or Exdure?’ (2014) 
45 NYIL 121; U. Linderfalk, ‘The Application of International Legal Norms Over Time: the Second Branch 
of Intertemporal Law’ (2011) 58/2 NILR 147. 
8
 See previous discussion on ‘rules’, ‘principles’ or ‘maxims’. 
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There has never been a shortage of publications regarding the content of the rule of 
interpretation as enshrined in Articles 31-33 VCLT. Despite this, to argue that there is 
nothing further to be clarified with respect to these rules would be far removed from 
reality. The ILC, for instance, is currently examining the topic ‘Treaties over Time / 
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation’.9 To 
attempt an exhaustive examination of all ‘grey’ areas of treaty interpretation would be an 
exercise in futility. In the ILA Study Group Road Map, the authors suggested that this topic 
could be divided into several sections, such as:  
 
 examining whether various principles of interpretation,10 such as the principle 
of effective interpretation, fit within Articles 31-33 VCLT (e.g. 31(3)(c) or 32 
VCLT), or whether they are separate rules of customary international law;  
 examining whether the VCLT rules of interpretation and their customary law 
counterparts have identical content or whether there are points of divergence; 
 examining what approaches/solutions have been adopted when textual 
interpretation conflicts with an interpretation based on the object and purpose 
of a treaty, or conflicts with the intention of the parties or the preparatory 
work (as well as any other permutation of these interpretations); and  
 whether the structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT reflects the practice 
and opinio juris of states.   
Despite the undeniable utility of this topic, the members of the Study Group were in 
agreement that three points should be borne in mind.  
 
 Firstly, the members noted that the exact areas of interest of this topic must 
be clearly delineated prior to inclusion in the Study Group’s research agenda. 
 Second, instead of focusing on this as a separate point of research, the 
members felt that it would benefit the Study Group’s work if the 
aforementioned questions were subsumed in the research to be conducted in 
the context of topics 1 and 3, i.e. pre-VCLT historical research and regime-
specific and cross-regime interpretative methods respectively.  
 Finally, all the members noted the importance of ensuring the originality of 
the research and avoiding replication of existing analysis.  
 
 
3. Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation 
 Recent work, both within the ILC and the academy, has addressed the topic of treaty 
interpretation over time.
11
 This topic raises myriad questions of interest: why, for example, 
                                                     
9
 G. Nolte, ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty 
Interpretation’, (19 March 2013) UN Doc A/CN.4/660; see also the second and third reports: (26 March 
2014) UN Doc A/CN.4/671; (7 April 2015) UN Doc A/CN.4/683 respectively. 
10
 Other principles that fit within this category include in pari materia interpretation and ejusdem generis, to 
name but a few. 
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is evolutionary interpretation adopted in relation to some treaties but not others? How 
might this be justified within the rubric of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention? 
Most importantly, ‘faced with the familiar paradox of accounting for difference under the 
sign of equality, the question of the day is how to explain such differential treatment within 
the law of treaties. What justifies weighing some rules of interpretation more strongly than 
others (i.e. emphasizing object and purpose over text, or vice versa)?”12  
 
 Whilst evolutive interpretation has been the object of sustained academic 
commentary in recent times, the broader question of how and why different international 
legal regimes interpret in different ways has not been subject to the same scrutiny.
13
 
Interpretation by the Appellate Body of the WTO, for example, is frequently characterised 
as textualist, whilst that of the European Court of Human Rights is generally seen as 
teleological. One fruitful avenue for enquiry could be to examine not only how interpretive 
approaches differ across legal regimes, but also why this occurs. Moreover, if such 
difference is not only rife, but also inevitable, do the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
actually tell us anything about how international law is, or should be, interpreted? If we 
acknowledge that their utility is limited, how are we then to approach the assessment of 
interpretation?  
 
 This proposal was well received by both those present at the Athens conference and 
those that had submitted comments in absentia, with many suggesting that this topic 
seemed to be the most promising avenue of research for the Study Group. The members 
present particularly noted that it could be a useful framework within which to also address 
topics one and two.  
  
 The main point of discussion in relation to the third topic was how to define the 
regimes that the Study Group could compare. Members considered that division by 
substantive treaty regime was the best approach to take, focusing predominantly – for 
reasons of practicality – on the practice of judicial bodies. Should the practice of other 
interpreters (States, international organizations, etc.) be readily available, it was agreed that 
these too should be examined. Specific regimes that members noted would be of interest 
include: the law of the sea, international trade law, human rights (national, regional, and 
international bodies), international investment law, international criminal law, international 
humanitarian law, environmental law, boundary disputes, international organizations law, 
and the law of the European Union. Members understood that this list would have to be 
narrowed down as the work of the Study Group progressed, but that the final selection of 
                                                                                                                                                                
11
 See for example, E. Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (OUP 2014); C. Djeffal, Static and 
Evolutionary Treaty Interpretation: A Functional Reconstruction (CUP 2015); G. Nolte (ed.), Treaties and 
Subsequent Practice (OUP 2013); and the work of the International Law Commission on ‘Subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties’. 
12
 J. Arato, ‘Accounting for Difference in Treaty Interpretation Over Time’, in A. Bianchi, D. Peat, & M. 
Windsor, Interpretation in International Law (OUP 2015) 206.  
13
 As pointed out by one member of the Study Gro-up present in Athens, a notable exception is the 
symposium published in the Revue Générale de Droit International Public (2011, No. 2). 
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case studies was something that could be made with the input of the full membership at the 
Johannesburg meeting.  
 
 
4. Interpretation of Customary International Law 
 
From the early writings of Grotius, Vattel and Pufendorf interpretation has always 
been at the epicentre of academic research and case-law. However, analysis of 
interpretation has focused mainly on treaties and ignored customary international law. The 
question that arises, then, is whether rules of customary international law can also be 
subject to interpretation. This issue has not been the subject of any extensive analysis. In 
fact, the current work of the ILC, although undoubtedly critical in the discourse 
surrounding the process of formation of customary international law, focuses on the two 




This leaves an entire stage in the ‘life-cycle’ of customary international law 
completely unexplored. Once a customary rule has emerged, and when it is considered for 
application within a particular case, should it not be open to interpretation similar to any 
treaty rule? The issue has been debated in academic discourse.
15
 It is interesting to note, 
however, that even in the discussions in the Advisory Committee of Jurists, responsible for 
drafting the PCIJ Statute, the members clearly acknowledged the interpretability of 
customary international law.
16
 Similarly, Art. 21(2) of the Rome Statute provides that 
‘[t]he Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decision’,17 although a member of the Study Group raised the point that this perhaps is not 
an acknowledgement of the interpretability of customary international law but rather a 
linguistic expression without any underlying connotations as to the issue at hand.  
                                                     
14
 M. Wood, ‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law’ (17 May 2013) UN 
Doc A/CN.4/663; see also the second and third reports: (22 May 2014) UN Doc A/CN.4/672; (27 March 
2015) UN Doc A/CN.4/682 respectively. 
15
 In favour: R. Kolb, Interprétation et création du droit international: esquisses d’ une herméneutique 
juridique moderne pour le droit international public (Bruylant 2006), 219 ; D. Alland, ‘L interpr tation du 
droit international public’ (2014) 362 RdC 41, 82-8 ; P. Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the 
Principle of Systemic Integration: Normative Shadows in Plato’s Cave (Martinus Nijhoff 2015), Chapter 4; 
A. Bleckmann, ‘Zur Feststellung und Auslegung von Völkergewohnheitsrecht’, (1977) 37 ZaöRV 504. 
Against: M. Bos, A Methodology of International Law (North-Holland 1984), 109; R. Bernhardt, 
‘Interpretation in International Law’, in: R. Bernhardt and R. L. Bindschedler (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Vol. II (North-Holland 1992), 1417; T. Treves, ‘Customary International Law’, MPEPIL 
1393 (November 2006), para. 2, available at: <www.mpepil.com> (last accessed on 15 July 2016).The issue 
has also been raised indirectly from a methodological angle, in: S. Talmon, ‘Determining Customary 
International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion’ (2015) 26/2 EJIL 
417; S. Talmon, ‘Determining Customary International Law: The ICJ’s Methodology between Induction, 
Deduction and Assertion’ (2015) 26/2 EJIL 417. 
16
 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès Verbaux of the Meetings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists 
(1920), 275 (emphasis added). 
17
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 
2187 UNTS 3, art. 21(2) and (3). Emphasis added. 
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 In addition to the above, dicta on the interpretability of customary international law 
seem to be contained in several landmark cases.
18
 Perhaps the most express recognition of 
the interpretability of customary international law can be found in Judge Tanaka’s 
Dissenting Opinion in North Sea Continental Shelf, where in no uncertain terms he opined 
that ‘[c]ustomary law, being vague and containing gaps compared with written law, 
requires precision and completion about its content. This task, in its nature being 
interpretative, would be incumbent upon the Court. The method of logical and teleological 
interpretation can be applied in the case of customary law as in the case of written law’.19  
 
Most members of the Study Group agreed that this was a fascinating topic that raised 
many questions, such as how interpretation of customary law differs from treaty 
interpretation, whether there is enough evidence on which to base a clear set of 
rules/principles of interpretation of customary law, and where formation of customary law 
ends and interpretation begins.
20
  However, the main concern raised by members was that, 
because of the unchartered waters of this research, if this topic was selected it would 
monopolise the time and resources of the Study Group to the detriment of the remaining 
points of research.
21
 The time-frame of the Study Group’s mandate, i.e. until 2018 seemed 
too restrictive to tackle this broad topic. 
 
An additional point that needs clarification is why the Road Map referred only to the 
interpretation of customary international law. This was not meant to suggest that general 
principles as a source of international law are not open to interpretation. It was rather a 
strategic choice on the part of the authors of the ILA Study Group Road Map to propose a 
topic that was feasible within the Study Group’s allotted time-frame. It was considered that 
it made more sense logically and substantively to tackle first the issue of interpretation of 
customary international law, before attempting to embark on examining the interpretability 
of the ‘general principles’.  
 
On the basis of the above, the Study Group was of the view that on the one hand the 
topic merited research, but on the other it was too complex for the limited time and 
resources of the Study Group. It was decided that the issue should be left on the table, 
                                                     
18
 Indicatively: North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, 181; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Merits) (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 178; 
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO, Panel 
Report adopted on 21 November 2006, WT/DS291R, WT/DS292R and WT/DS293R, paras. 7.68-7.72. 
19
 North Sea Continental Shelf (n18), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, 181 (emphasis added). 
20
 A member of the Study Group was of the view that the ‘interpretation’ to which the Study Group referred 
applied only to words, consequently customary international law was not open to interpretation; rather any 
purported act of interpretation of customary international law is better understood as an act of elaboration, 
referring to: C.A. Bradley, ‘Customary International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication’ 
(SSRN, 9 February 2015), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2559190 (last 
accessed on 15 July 2016). 
21
 Another issue raised was the fear of ending up with an infinite regression argument. The Co-rapporteur 
suggested that such concerns were not unique to the interpretation of customary international law but were 
part and parcel of the entire process of interpretation. In addition, he suggested, that in any event the concept 
of ‘constructive rules’ of Anzilotti could offer a theoretical foundation to tackle any such concerns.  
- 10 - 
awaiting the comments and discussions in Johannesburg, at which time a final decision on 
its future would be taken. In any event, it was felt that if the Study Group’s research was 
devoted to other areas, a small section in the final report of the Study Group should outline 
that the importance of the interpretation of customary international law had been identified, 
but that for practical reasons it may be better suited for future research by another Study 
Group or Committee.  
 
  
5. Interpretation of Unilateral Acts and Declarations 
 
 The interpretation of unilateral acts is a topic that has attracted scant attention in the 
literature. Unilateral acts were the focus of a Working Group of the International Law 
Commission from 1996 to 2006, which culminated in the adoption of ten ‘guiding 
principles’ applicable to unilateral acts,22 largely focussed on examining when such acts 
are to be considered as binding.
23
 The ILC addressed the interpretation of such acts, 
notably in Principle 7, which states that “in interpreting the content of such obligations, 
weight shall be given first to the text of the declaration, together with the context and the 
circumstances in which it was formulated.”24 The Commentary to this Principle endorses 
the statement of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases, according to which “when States make 
statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is 
called for.”25 However, whilst the ILC did touch on the interpretation of unilateral acts, its 
work was mainly based on a handful of cases before the ICJ; an examination of the 
treatment of unilateral acts outside of judicial proceedings could yield different 
conclusions.  
 
 Rarely, however, are claims brought against States on the basis that they breached a 
unilateral statement to be legally bound to a certain course of action. The utility of 
examining the interpretation of unilateral acts in general is therefore questionable, and is 
likely to be based on sparse practice if pursued. The Co-Rapporteurs suggested that it may 
be useful to examine the interpretation of two specific kinds of unilateral acts: optional 
clause declarations made pursuant to Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, and schedules of 
commitments of WTO members. Both have been referred to in the literature as having a 
‘hybrid’ character – they are unilateral acts that gain legal normativity because of (in the 
case of optional clause declarations) compliance with a conventional procedure, or (in the 
case of schedules of commitments) the agreement of other States Parties to the treaty. The 
main question regarding interpretation in this context is whether it is justifiable to accord 
more importance to the intention of the ‘declaring’ State than otherwise would be the case 
for treaty interpretation. A further line of enquiry might be to examine what reasons exist – 
if any – to differentiate between interpretation of an optional clause declaration and a 
                                                     
22
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two, 369. 
23
 Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France), [1974] ICJ Rep 457.  
24
 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two, 377.  
25
 Nuclear Tests case (n23), para. 47.  
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schedule of commitments, and what this might tell us about the interpretation of unilateral 
acts more generally.  
 
 On the basis of the Road Map and presentations by the Rapporteurs, the members 
present at the Athens meeting noted that this topic was underexplored but generally felt 
that it was less pressing than the abovementioned topics of treaty interpretation. Some 
members queried whether acts that were made pursuant to multilateral treaties, such as 
WTO schedules of commitments, could truly be called unilateral acts. The consensus view 
was that this topic could not form the focus of the Study Group’s work.   
 
 
6. Interpretation of Acts/Secondary Instruments of International 
Organisations 
 
 Whilst the interpretation of treaties has remained the main focus of academic study, 
the proliferation of treaty regimes that endow international organizations and treaty bodies 
with the power to adopt resolutions, decisions, or recommendations suggests that the 
interpretation of such secondary instruments is growing in importance. The paradigm 
example – and the one which has attracted most academic commentary – is of course the 
interpretation of UN Security Council Resolutions.
26
 But this is clearly not the only 
example: resolutions of the International Maritime Organization, regulations of the 
International Seabed Authority, as well as resolutions adopted by conferences or meetings 
of the Parties to multilateral environmental agreements, the internal practice and rules of an 
organization, all provide illustrative examples of instruments adopted by an international 
body which may require interpretation. Considering that international activities are 
regulated to a significant extent by such secondary instruments, one possible avenue of 
enquiry for the Study Group would be to explore how these instruments are interpreted and 
if one could formulate any general principles (or customary rules) that regulate their 
interpretation.   
 
 The general presumption has been to approach the interpretation of secondary 
instruments by analogy to the rules governing the interpretation of treaties, basing 
interpretation on Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.
27
 However, this has been quite rightly 
called into question. For example, is it appropriate to adopt the Vienna Convention’s focus 
on the intention of the Parties when interpreting secondary instruments? How could the 
mechanical transposition of the rules of treaty interpretation account for the variations in 
                                                     
26
 M. Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’, (1998) Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law 73.  
27
 Wood (n26), 85 et seq; Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, Seabed Dispute Chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Sea, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, Case No. 17, paras. 57 et seq; ICTY, (interpretation of Statute); 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo 
(Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, para. 95; Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Interlocutory Decision on 
the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 16 February 
2011, STL-11-01/I, para 26 et seq.  
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the institutional, procedural, and legal context in which secondary instruments are 
adopted? Should the interpretation of constitutive instruments (such as the Statute of the 
ICTY) differ from the interpretation of other instruments? 
 
 Whilst expressing interest in this topic, members considered that it was not an 
appropriate avenue of enquiry for the Study Group. In particular, it was noted that the topic 
might prove to be too varied and the contextual differences too significant to draw any 
general conclusions. It was, however, noted by one member that some elements of this 




Various points for consideration were raised orally and in writing by members of the 
Study Group. Some of these have already been incorporated in the previous Sections, but 
some defied categorization. For reasons of convenience and in order to assist the 
discussions in Johannesburg they are reproduced below: 
 
 One member of the Study Group noted that the interpretative authority of various 
types of commentary on treaties on specialist topics warrants attention. In the view 
of the Co-Rapporteurs, this could be examined with the context of topic 3; 
 The question was raised whether the interpretation of codification treaties should be 
considered as treaty interpretation or the interpretation of customary international 
law, or whether there are special rules on the subject. Again, it is suggested that this 
could be treated under topic 3 and/or 4; 
 In relation to topic 3, it was highlighted that the term ‘regime’ needs to be clarified 
in order to determine the methodology to be used by the Study Group; 
 It was suggested that topic 3 should be approached in two stages. The first stage 
would consist of detailing the interpretive approaches adopted in different 
international legal regimes. This would provide the basis for the second stage, in 
which the Study Group would explore and identify the reasons for the differences 
across ‘regimes’.  
 The Co-Rapporteur suggested that members may find it instructive to consult R.S. 
Summers & D.N. MacCormick (eds), Interpreting Statutes (Dartmouth 1991) as an 
example of a previous comparative project that examined interpretation across 
different jurisdictions.  
V. CONCLUSION & NEXT STEPS 
    
On the basis of the ILA Study Group Road Map, the inaugural meeting in Athens and 
the comments of the members, there was consensus among the members of the Study 
Group that the scope of potential topics for the Study Group’s attention was currently too 
broad.  Finalization of the research agenda and the division of labour was deferred to the 
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Study Group’s meeting in Johannesburg. The Closed Session in Johannesburg should be 
used to determine the direction of the Study Group’s work in light of the Preliminary 
Report and the comments of the members. Inspiration would also be drawn from the 
comments of the ILA members present during the Open Session.   
 
In terms of substantive conclusions, some provisional agreements and arrangements 
have arisen prior to the meeting in Johannesburg. It was agreed that the first part of the 
Road Map would be revised to outline a brief history of treaty interpretation in order to 
provide context for the subsequent sections. All members expressed willingness to 
contribute to the work of the Study Group. In their individual comments, some members 
indicated a preference for specific topics. Once the methodological approach of the Study 
Group has been determined - in particular in relation to topic 3 of the Road Map - 
allocation of research and output responsibilities will be circulated to the members.  
 
Finally, members were in agreement that the output of the Study Group’s research 
will take not only the form of a final report, but also of an edited volume.  
